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RATIONAL JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR:
A STATISTICAL STUDY
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner1
I. INTRODUCTION
A large literature, mainly in political science, uses statistical techniques to explain various aspects of judicial behavior,
with particular emphasis on federal appellate judges—circuit
(that is, court of appeals) judges and Supreme Court Justices.
Legal writers have tended to ignore this literature despite its
richness,2 in part because its vocabulary and empirical methodology are unfamiliar and in part because, unlike economic
analysis of law, it does not have clear implications for the reform of legal doctrine and cannot readily be integrated into the
teaching of the major law school courses. We believe, however,
that it has a great deal to offer to the understanding of judicial
behavior—a subject of theoretical interest to economists as well
as to other social scientists and to academic lawyers and of
practical significance to lawyers and judges.3 We try to make a
distinctive contribution to the literature in this paper.
A number of the previous studies, listed in Appendix A to
this paper, are based, as is ours, on one of two large databases
(or both)—a court of appeals database called the “Songer” da-
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The authors thank Alicia Beyer, Allison Handy, and Tara Kadioglu for
their very helpful research assistance. In addition, Handy did the first draft
of the appendices. We thank Lee Epstein, Emerson Tiller, and other participants in the Political Economy Colloquium of Northwestern University
School of Law, where we gave an earlier version of this paper on September
24, 2007, for their helpful comments; participants in the University of Chicago Workshop on Rational Models in the Social Sciences, where an earlier
version of the paper was given on October 30, 2007, for their helpful comments; and the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics for support.
2 A richness exemplified by James L. Gibson, “From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study of Judicial Behavior,” 5 Political Behavior 7 (1983).
3 Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard University Press, forthcoming 2008).
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tabase4 and a Supreme Court database called the “Spaeth” database.5 These databases record data on a large sample of court
of appeals cases decided since 1925 and Supreme Court cases
decided since 1937. (Appendix B describes the databases.)
Many of the data collected about each case—such as the date of
the case, the main issue in it, and its disposition by the
court—are straightforward or nearly so. But a critical datum is
not. It is the classification of the vote of each judge or Justice
as being “liberal,” “conservative,” “mixed,” or “other.” The
“mixed” and “other” categories are found only in the court of
appeals database. “Mixed” means that the judge voted for an
intermediate outcome, for example to affirm a criminal conviction but reduce the sentence—in other words, he cast a liberal
vote on one issue and a conservative vote on another in the
same case. “Other” means that the vote had no political valence—usually because the opposing sides could not be classified as “liberal” and “conservative.” The ideological classifications of votes are dependent variables in studies that seek to
explain judicial behavior by reference to judges’ characteristics,
such as (the particular interest of political scientists who study
the courts) whether a judge is “liberal” or “conservative.” That
characteristic is usually proxied by the party of the President
who appointed the judge—if it was the Democratic Party the
judge is deemed “liberal” and if the Republican Party “conservative.” Other proxies are sometimes used, however.
4

The “U.S. Courts of Appeals Database” was originally compiled by Donald
R. Songer, and updated by Ashlyn K. Kuersten and Susan B. Haire. It is
archived at the S. Sidney Ulmer Project for Research in Law and Judicial
Politics, available at www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject. For data about
the attributes of the judges, we used “The Attributes of Federal Court
Judges Database,” originally compiled by Gary Zuk, Deborah J. Barrow,
and Gerard S. Gryski, also archived at the S. Sidney Ulmer Project home
page, and sometimes referred to as the “Auburn” database.
5 The U.S. Supreme Court database was compiled by Harold J. Spaeth (for
the 1953–2000 terms), and by Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A. Segal (for the
1937–1952 and 2001–2006 terms). The justice-centered databases we used
(“The Justice-Centered Warren Court Database,” “The Justice-Centered
Burger Court Database,” and “The Justice-Centered Rehnquist Database”)
were created from the original database by Sara C. Benesh. The databases
are archived at the S. Sidney Ulmer Project for Research in Law and Judicial Politics, note 4 above. For ? Finish statement or get rid of “For”
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Of course it is possible to question the assumption that all
judges appointed by Democratic Presidents are liberal and all
judges appointed by Republican Presidents are conservative.
But for some purposes the realism of the assumption is irrelevant. If the question, for example, is whether Democratic
Presidents appoint more liberal judges than Republican Presidents do, the classification of the votes supplies the answer: If
judges appointed by Democratic Presidents vote more often for
liberal outcomes than judges appointed by Republican Presidents, it doesn’t matter whether a particular judge, when appointed, would have been considered liberal.
But the classification of judges’ votes is problematic in the
two databases. A problem limited to the court of appeals database is that the coders who classified decisions as liberal or
conservative (or mixed or other) apparently had trouble classifying older cases. A spot check of 40 cases, 10 from each approximately 20-year period in the database (which, remember,
covers the 77 years from 1925 to 2002), reveals a high error
rate in cases decided before 1960.6 Second—and again this is a
more serious problem with the court of appeals database—a
number of the systematic classification decisions that the coders made are erroneous, such as classifying all votes for plaintiffs in intellectual-property cases as liberal. We have reviewed
and corrected the systematic classifications, as explained in
Appendix C to this paper. But we have not reread enough of
the actual decisions to be able to correct the misclassification of
individual cases as distinct from categories such as intellectual
property.
The databases corrected in the manner just indicated are
the source of the data in our statistical analysis, so let us see
just how significant our corrections are. Table 1 compares the
number of liberal, conservative, and unclassified votes in the
Supreme Court database, with and without our corrections.
Table 2 makes the same comparison for the court of appeals
database but with the addition of “mixed” votes. The principal
effect of the corrections is to increase the number of decisions
that are not classified as ideological. The corrections are not
6

In the first sample, consisting of cases decided between 1925 and 1940,
the error rate is 40 percent; in the second sample, 1940 to 1959, it is 20 percent; but for the period from 1960 to 2002 it is only 10 percent.
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major in the Supreme Court database but do lead to substantial changes in the court of appeals database.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here]
Applying statistical methodology to the corrected databases, we explore a range of empirical questions, such as
whether a judge’s political voting behavior changes over his
term of office and whether it depends on the ideological makeup of the other judges on the court—that is, whether social influence or group effects play a role in judicial decision making.
We are especially though not exclusively interested in testing
hypotheses derived from a rational-choice (economic) approach
to judicial behavior. We do not propose a formal economic
model of judicial behavior, but in the next part we sketch an
informal such model to guide our empirical analysis.
Before turning to that, however, we note one more methodological innovation. Social scientists have become very interested in recent years in group effects, such as group polarization, but most of their empirical work on such effects utilize
students as experimental subjects. Judicial voting at the appellate level (trial judges sit by themselves) provides an opportunity to observe the behavior (in the form of votes) of actual
rather than experimental groups, and thus avoids criticisms of
extrapolating from experimental to real social situations.
II. RATIONAL JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
Our analysis in this paper is limited to federal judges (Supreme Court Justices and federal circuit—i.e., court of appeals—judges). Federal judges who are appointed under Article
III of the Constitution (as Supreme Court Justices and federal
district and circuit judges are, but other federal judicial officers, such as magistrate judges, bankruptcy judges, and administrative law judges, are not) have an unusual career structure and employment conditions. The federal judiciary is primarily a lateral-entry system, judges being appointed in their
40s or 50s after a career in another branch of the legal profession. Promotion from one tier of the judiciary to another is un-
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usual, so that for most federal judges there is no promotion
carrot to motivate them. “External” promotion (appointment to
a higher-paying job in the private sector) is rare; the judicial
appointment normally is terminal. Nor can federal judges receive bonuses or raises for exceptional performance. Nor can
their pay be docked for substandard performance, and the removal of judges from office is virtually impossible unless they
engage in criminal behavior. Their outside income is strictly
limited, and of course they are not permitted to hear cases in
which they might have a direct or indirect pecuniary stake.
With the ordinary motivations and constraints that are designed to minimize agency costs being absent, it is difficult to
model judicial behavior in rational-choice terms. And no doubt
emotional and other psychological factors play a larger role in
judicial behavior than in that of normal employees. But we believe that most judicial behavior is rational and hence that
there is a judicial utility function.7 We would expect that leisure would be a major argument in the judicial utility function,
as in that of any rational individual with secure tenure; also
self-expression, for example of political preferences, since there
are no (or very weak) penalties for basing judicial decisions on
such preferences. Another argument in the judicial utility function is likely to be esteem (prestige, reputation, etc.), which in
turn is likely to make judges averse to being reversed. With
these arguments, we will be able to suggest explanations for a
number of the findings in our statistical analysis.
III. ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT VOTING: 1937–2006
Our Supreme Court sample contains 43 Justices (including
eight who were appointed prior to 1937) and 637 observations.
As suggested by Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn,8 we exclude
from most of our analysis 9–0 decisions on the ground that they
are unlikely to involve the kind of ideological issues that divide
judges. Differently stated, the fact that all the Justices agree
7

See references in Posner, note 3 above, ch. 1.
See Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn, “Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court,
1953–1999,” 10 Political Analysis 134, 137 n. 3 (2002).
8
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on a particular outcome suggests that ideological considerations play a negligible role in the vote on the case. We do, however, present a separate analysis of 9–0 decisions to see if the
recorded ideological direction of unanimous decisions is related
to the Justices’ ideological make-up.
A. Judicial Ideology Rankings.
Table 3 ranks the Justices in our sample from most to least
conservative on the basis of their judicial votes. Rehnquist and
Thomas rank as the most conservative Justices, while Thomas,
Roberts, and Alito are the most conservative in economic cases
(economic regulation, labor, and tax).9 At the other end of the
ideological spectrum, Justices Marshall, Douglas, Murphy, and
Rutledge are the most liberal, although Black is the most liberal in the economic-regulation category. We present results in
two other subject-matter categories as well: civil liberties (all
cases minus economic-regulation, labor, and tax cases) and
adjusted civil liberties (which excludes from the civil liberties
category federalism and judicial-power cases). The two civil
liberties categories track all cases closely because civil liberties
cases account for 67 percent of all votes in nonunanimous
cases. Notice the drop in the fraction of conservative votes of
the most liberal Justices (except for Marshall) in the adjusted
compared to the unadjusted civil liberties category. Apparently
issues of federalism and judicial power tend to be less ideological than issues involving personal liberty.
[Insert Table 3]
Our ideological rankings are generally consistent with
what everyone knows to be the ideological differences among
Supreme Court Justices—the Justices at the top are indeed
more conservative than those at the bottom—but some of the
specific rankings cannot be taken seriously. For example, Kennedy is more conservative than O’Connor, Ginsburg more conservative than Blackmun, McReynolds more conservative than
Powell. And Justices who served 70 years ago are difficult to
9

It should be noted, however, that the calculations for Roberts and Alito are
based on votes in only two terms.
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place on the same ideological scale as current Justices, because
the meaning of liberal and conservative have changed over this
period.
Table 3 includes three other ideology measures. One, labeled “S/C score,” is based on a content analysis by Jeffrey A.
Segal and Albert D. Cover of newspaper editorials published
prior to the Justice’s confirmation but limited to Justices appointed after 1945. The Segal/Cover scores range from 0 (most
liberal) to 1 (most conservative).10 The two remaining measures
are based, like ours, on judicial votes. Martin and Quinn derive
ideology scores from votes in nonunanimous cases, using the
uncorrected Spaeth Supreme Court database, while Epstein et
al. calculate the fraction of conservative and liberal votes in the
adjusted civil liberties category on the basis of an expansion of
the Spaeth database to cover the 1946 to 2004 terms, but the
expanded database, like the original one, does not correct for
erroneous ideological classifications. Table 4 is a correlation
matrix of the various ideology measures.
[Insert Table 4 here]
It is no surprise that the measures based on actual votes
are more highly correlated with each other than the Segal/Cover scores, which are based on newspaper editorials that
in effect predict the Justice’s judicial voting. In contrast,
though unsurprising in view of the fact that our adjustments to
the Supreme Court database have only slight effects overall,
the correlations between our data and Epstein et al.’s in Table
3 are above .95 except for the correlation between their civilliberties category and our economic-regulation category. Nevertheless the high positive correlations between the Segal/Cover
scores and the fraction of conservative votes suggest that
newspaper editorials prior to appointment are surprisingly
good predictors. Indeed, Segal/Cover scores will turn out to be

10

We have transformed them to 0 for most liberal and to 1 for most conservative in order to make them easier to compare to our fraction of conservative votes ranking. The Segal/Cover scores are reproduced in Table 6–1 in
Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions & Developments (4th ed. 2007).
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highly significant predictors in our regression analysis of judicial voting.

Figure 1 depicts the relation between Segal-Cover scores
and the fraction of conservative votes in all categories for the
36 Justices whose Segal-Cover scores are available.11 As expected, Justices appointed by Republican Presidents (denoted
by the symbol “x”) tend to vote more conservatively and have
higher Segal-Cover scores, while judges appointed by Democratic Presidents ( “o”) tend to vote less conservatively and have
lower Segal-Cover scores. Notice that the positive relation between the fraction of conservative votes and Segal-Cover scores
is similar for Justices appointed by Republican and Democratic
Presidents.12
Several outliers in Figure 1 should be noted. Jackson and
(the second) Harlan (also Vinson and Stewart, but less so)
11

The straight line in Figure 1 depicts the regression (t-statistics in parentheses) Y = .315 (7.29) + .390 (5.10)X where Y and X denote the fraction of
conservative votes and and the Segal-Cover scores respectively.
12 There was no significant difference between the regression coefficients
when we estimated separate regressions for Republican and Democratic
appointees only. (Alternatively, can have "is" with "estimate" for consistent
verb tense)
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voted more conservatively than predicted by their Segal/Cover
scores, while Stevens, Souter, Byrnes, Stone, and Blackmun
voted more liberally than expected. These discrepancies suggest that Presidents sometimes do not have good public and
private information concerning the ideological proclivities of
possible Supreme Court candidates. Nevertheless, Table 5 reveals a strong correlation between the political party of the appointing President and the voting behavior of the Justices appointed by a President of that party. In each of the 11 subjectmatter categories (excluding a miscellaneous category in which
there is only 1 nonunanimous vote), the fraction of conservative
votes cast by Justices appointed by a Republican President is
greater than that cast by Justices appointed by a Democratic
President—and significantly so except in the privacy category,
which has the fewest votes.
This finding, which is consistent with a large empirical literature in political science, supports the hypothesis of a selfexpression argument in the judicial utility function. Justices
tend to have political views similar to those of the President
who appoints them. The freedom of federal judges from the
usual sticks and carrots of an employment situation enables
them to express those views, even though it may make them
unfaithful agents of Congress (when they are interpreting federal statutes) or the framers and ratifiers of constitutional provisions (when they are interpreting the Constitution).
This is not to suggest that Justices appointed by Republican Presidents always cast a conservative vote or Justices appointed by Democratic presidents always a liberal one. The
former vote liberal more than conservative in 3 of the 11 categories in Table 5, while the latter vote liberal more than conservative in 9 categories. “Privacy” and “Judicial Power” are
the two categories in which both types of appointee vote most
conservatively. The biggest difference is found in “Civil
Rights,” “Due Process” and “Unions.” In these categories, Justices appointed by a Republican President are more than 50
percent more likely than those appointed by a Democratic
President to vote conservatively.
[Insert Table 5 here]
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Martin and Quinn, and Epstein et al., suggest that a Justice’s judicial ideology may vary over his tenure, depending on
strategic considerations, changes in preferences, and changes
in the composition of cases before the court.13 We tested this
hypothesis by estimating separate regressions for each Justice
who served 15 or more terms. The dependent variable is the
fraction of the Justice’s conservative votes (y) and the independent variable is the length of time that he served (or has
served, if he is a current Justice) on the Supreme Court (where
x equals 1 for his first term, 2 for his second term, and so on).
We make the simplifying assumption that the Justice’s judicial
ideology either is constant over time (the regression coefficient
is statistically insignificant) or changes linearly (the Justice
becomes more or less conservative at a constant rate, as shown
by whether the regression coefficient is significantly positive or
significantly negative). The changing-ideology hypothesis is
supported for 11 of the 21 Justices who served a minimum of
15 terms.14 We find statistically significant negative coefficients for Blackmun, Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, O’Connor,
Rehnquist, Stevens, and Souter and statistically significant
positive coefficients for Frankfurter, Reed and White.15 That is,
all of these Justices became either more liberal or more conservative in their judicial voting over the course of their career on
the Court. Of the eight Justices who became more liberal, six
were appointed by Republican Presidents; the three who became more conservative had all been appointed by Democratic
Presidents. This is further support for a self-expression argument in the judicial utility function. The Justices are not faithful agents of their appointing President because there is noth13

See id.; Epstein et al., note 9 above.
We used 15 terms as the cut-off to increase the reliability of our estimates. If we estimate regressions for all 43 Justices, we also find significant
negative coefficients for Ginsburg (14 terms), Murphy (10 terms), Rutledge
(7 terms), and Souter (11 terms), and significant positive coefficients for
Jackson (12 terms), Owen Roberts (8 terms), and Whittaker (6 terms).
15 There is substantial overlap between our findings and those in Martin
and Quinn and in Epstein et al. Martin and Quinn find that Justices Black,
Frankfurter, Thomas, and White became more conservative while Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Souter became more liberal.
Epstein et al. find no trends for Marshall and Brennan but liberal trends for
Warren, Clark, and Powell.
14
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ing the President can do (even before the President leaves office) to affect their welfare.
The moderation of Rehnquist’s conservative stance seems
related to his becoming Chief Justice in 1986. If we add a
dummy variable for the period of his chief justiceship, the regression coefficient is negative (indicating about a 10 percent
decline in the fraction of conservative votes) and nearly significant, while the coefficient on the tenure variable becomes insignificant.
B. Unanimous Votes.
Figure 2 shows that about 30 percent of the Supreme
Court cases in our database were decided unanimously (defined as 9–0 votes). Somewhat surprisingly in light of the belief
that ideological differences among the Justices have been
growing, the fraction of unanimous decisions has been trending
upward and is now in the 40 percent range. This means we
have excluded a substantial fraction of Supreme Court decisions by limiting our analysis to nonunanimous decisions. In a
court made up of liberal, moderate, and conservative justices,
ideology is unlikely to be an important consideration in a
unanimous decision. But since many of the unanimous decisions are coded as conservative or liberal, we might expect the
ideological direction of these decisions to be related to the Justices’ ideology.
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Figure 2 shows that the higher the fraction of Justices appointed by Republican Presidents, the higher the fraction of
unanimous decisions that are conservative. And regressing the
fraction of conservative votes in unanimous decisions against
the fraction of Justices appointed by Republican Presidents
yields a positive regression coefficient of .240 and a t-statistic
of 3.90 (significant at the .01 level). However, if we add a linear
time trend variable to the regression neither the trend nor the
fraction of Justices appointed by Republican Presidents is statistically significant because the two variables are highly correlated (.84). In short, there appears to be a positive relationship between the fraction of conservative unanimous votes and
the fraction of Justices appointed by Republican Presidents but
we cannot reject the hypothesis that this effect vanishes once
we account for the positive time trend in the fraction of conservative unanimous decisions.16
16

The fraction of Justices appointed by Republican Presidents is only a
proxy for the ideological makeup of the Justices because Presidents have
sometimes appointed Judges who turn out to have ideologies that differ
from the appointing President. (Some well-known examples are
Eisenhower’s appointment of Brennan, Ford’s appointment of Stevens and
Bush I’s appointment of Souter.) As an alternative measure of judicial ideology, we classified the 43 Justices into one of three categories: conservative

Judicial Behavior

13

C. Regression Analysis of Nonunanimous Votes.
Our regression analysis seeks to explain the percentage of
conservative votes in nonunanimous decisions by the Supreme
Court as a function of a set of variables that seem likely to influence the ideological direction of a Justice’s vote.17 Table 6
defines the variables in the analysis and Table 7 presents the
regressions.
[Insert Table 6 here]
We base our analysis on two regression equations:
(1)

IDi = α0 + α1Xi + ui

(2)

FrConij = β0 + β1Xi + β2ui +β3Yij + w

In equation (1), IDi denotes the ith Justice’s ideology prior to his
appointment (as proxied by his Segal/Cover score),18 X i is a set
of factors likely to predict his ideology (such as the party of the
appointing President, the fraction of senators who are Republicans, the year or first term of the judge, and prior experience
(14 Justices), moderate (11) and liberal (18), and then re-estimated the regression substituting the number of conservative and the number of liberal
Justices each term (the left-out variable is the number of moderate judges).
As in the regressions in which we use the fraction of Justices appointed by
Republican Presidents, we find no significant effects of the conservative/liberal categories on the fraction of conservative unanimous decisions
when we also include a time-trend variable.
17 The percentage of liberal votes is simply 1 minus the percentage of conservative votes, since the Supreme Court database does not contain “mixed”
or “other” categories but only “conservative” and “liberal.”
18 See Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics of
Judicial Appointments 108–113 (2005), for a concise description of how ideology scores are computed from editorials. Segal and Cover first coded each
paragraph in editorials written about the candidate’s likely views as describing the candidate as conservative, liberal, or moderate, and then subtracted the fraction coded liberal from the fraction coded conservative and
divided by the total number of paragraphs. The scores range from +1 for
pure liberal and –1 for pure conservative. These scores are reproduced in
Epstein et al., note 9 above, tab. 4–17, for Justices nominated between 1937
and 2006.
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as a federal court of appeals judge) and u i is the residual, that
is, the difference between the Justice’s actual and predicted
voting-ideology score. In equation (2), the dependent variable
(FrConij) is the fraction of conservative votes that each Justice
cast per term from 1937 to 2006, and the independent variables
include Xi, u i, and such other factors (Y) as prior judicial experience, years on the Supreme Court, a time trend, and a variable that we call “group effects” or “social influence,” which estimates the influence of other members of the Court on Justice
i’s votes. A positive (negative) ui in equation (1) indicates that
the Justice’s conservative ideology score is higher (lower) than
the Xi variables predict. In other words, the Justice is even
more conservative than one could have predicted. This implies
that he will vote more conservatively in equation (2) than a
Justice with a lower u i would. Similarly, the larger a Justice’s
negative ui the more likely he is to vote liberally.
The group-effects variable tests whether the ideological
leanings of other members of the Court influence the ideological cast of a Justice’s votes and, if so, in what direction. Three
group effects should be distinguished. One is conformity:
wanting to conform to the majority. We do not interpret this as
a psychological phenomenon, although social psychologists discuss it in those terms; instead, we relate it to (rational) dissent
aversion.
The second group effect or social influence that we consider
is group polarization: deliberation among persons who lean in
one direction is likely to make them lean even farther in that
direction. The economic interpretation (though again there is
also a psychological one) is that a person who takes an extreme
view, bucking the majority, is likely to be the best informed,
and so it is rational for the other members of the group to be
persuaded by him). If conformity dominates, an increase in the
fraction of Justices appointed by Republican Presidents should
lead a Justice to vote more conservatively, whether a Republican or a Democratic President appointed him. In contrast,
group polarization would lead a Justice appointed by a Republican President to vote more conservatively as the fraction of
Justices appointed by Republican Presidents increase but
would not affect the voting of Justices appointed by a Democratic President.
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In a different sense, polarization could refer to two interacting groups’ growing farther apart, as when political scientists speak of the growing “polarization” of the American electorate. Here an increase in the fraction of Justices appointed by
Republican Presidents could lead Justices appointed by a Republican President to vote more conservatively and Justices
appointed by a Democratic President to vote more liberally. We
shall call this third social influence “political polarization,” but
we do not have an economic interpretation for it.
[Insert Tables 7 here]
Now to the results: The variables in the first regression
equation explain about 43 percent of the variance in Segal/Cover scores (IDi) Two of the four variables in equation (1)
are statistically significant. Justices appointed by Republican
Presidents have significantly higher conservative scores than
those appointed by Democratic Presidents, as we predict. And
holding constant the party of the appointing President’s, more
recent appointees have significantly higher ideology scores
(that is, they tend to be more conservative). But our main interest in equation (1) is in supplying an ideological variable for
use in regressions based on equation (2). These are regressions
(2) through (4) in Table 7. In regression (2) the dependent variable is the fraction of conservative votes by Justices whether
they are appointed by Republican or Democratic Presidents. In
regressions (3) and (4) the dependent variable also is the fraction of conservative votes but regression (3) is limited to Justices appointed by Republican Presidents, and regression (4) to
Justices appointed by Democratic Presidents.
Regression (2) reveals as expected that Justices appointed
by Republican Presidents tend to vote conservative in a higher
fraction of cases (about 15 percent higher across all categories)
than Justices appointed by Democratic Presidents. The political composition of the Senate at the time of the Justice’s appointment also has a separate and significant effect on how
ideological a Justice turns out to be. For example, a change in
the lineup in the Senate from 53 to 47 Republicans reduces the
fraction of conservative votes of a Justice appointed by a Republican President by .076 (=.06 x 1.27 in regression (3)) and of
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a Justice appointed by a Democratic President by .040 (=.06 x
.67 in regression (4)). In contrast, regression (1) indicates that
the composition of the Senate does not have a significant effect
on a Justice’s observed pre-appointment ideology score. The
combination of the Senate having no impact on observed preconfirmation ideology but a significant impact on how a Justice’s later votes suggests that Senators have private information about the ideological leanings of Supreme Court candidates that is not publicly available as evidenced by the content
of newspaper editorials (for remember that Segal/Cover scores
are based on newspaper editorials about the candidates). This
implies further that make up of the Senate also influences the
President’s choice of whom he appoints to the Court for the
greater the fraction of Republican senators, holding constant
the observed ideology of the appointee and the President’s
party, the more conservative the Justice turns out to be.
The most significant variable in regressions (2) through (4)
is the residual (u) from equation (1)—the difference between
the Segal/Cover score and the predicted ideology score. As expected, the fraction of conservative votes significantly increases
as u increases. Consider Justice Brennan, who was appointed
by a Republican President (Eisenhower) and confirmed by a
Senate equally divided between Republicans and Democrats.
Although Brennan’s Segal/Cover score is 0 (the maximum liberal score), his predicted ideology score in regression (1) is .577,
which gives Brennan the highest unexplained liberal score
(negative residual). In regression (3) this implies that Brennan
would vote liberally on average in 65 percent of the cases compared to 45 percent if one did not know Brennan’s Segal/Cover
score but knew the party of the appointing President and the
make-up of the Senate at the time of Brennan’s appointment…
Here are two examples at the other extreme. Roosevelt appointed James Byrnes in 1941, when Democrats outnumbered
Republican Senators by more than 2 to 1. Byrnes’s predicted
ideology score from regression (1) was .231, yet his Segal/Cover
score was a relatively conservative .67. Similarly, in 1945
Truman appointed Burton, whose Segal/Cover score was .72
but whose predicted ideology score was .260. Byrnes and Burton have the highest unexplained conservative scores (.439 and
.459 respectively) of any Justice in our sample, and this results
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in about 16 percent more conservative votes by Byrnes and
Burton than would be predicted from regression (1).
The SCRep variable tests whether a Justice’s colleagues
influence his vote. The significance of social influence on individual behavior is well documented, and it would hardly be
surprising to find that judges are not immune from it. The conformity hypothesis predicts a positive sign of the SCRep variable in regressions (2)–(4)—that is, that the larger the fraction
of Justices appointed by Republican Presidents, the more conservatively each Justice will vote. We find the opposite—negative signs that are highly significant in two of the
three regression equations. Our results thus suggest that there
is no conformity effect, or, equivalently, “dissent aversion,” in
the Supreme Court. We offer an economic explanation later,
when we discuss our finding that there is dissent aversion in
the courts of appeals.
Our SCRep variable does not allow us to test the grouppolarization effect directly (that is, the tendency of an in-group
to take a more extreme position than the average member of
the group, owing to the influence of its most extreme members19) because we do not know whether an increase (decrease)
in SCRep implies that a new Justice is more (less) conservative
than the Justices that were previously appointed by Republican (Democratic) Presidents. However, the larger the relative
size of the in-group, the likelier there is to be a grouppolarization effect because the likelier there is to be a member
with more extreme views than in a smaller group, for the
smaller the group, the lower the probability that there will be a
member in the tail of the distribution in which the most extreme views are found. Also, there will be fewer opponents.
Hence the SCRep variable provides an indirect test of the hypothesis. But our results fail to support it. We find a negative
(not positive) though insignificant effect of SCRep in the Republican-only regression (regression (3)) and a highly significant negative effect in the Democratic-only regression (regression (4)). The implication is that Justices appointed by Democratic Presidents become more liberal as they become more out19

Alice H. Eagly and Shelly Chaiken, The Psychology of Attitudes 655–659
(1993).
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numbered. This is consistent with conservative Justices’ tending to be ideologically more committed—their views are less
affected by the views of liberal Justices, whereas the liberals
are not roused to assert their full liberalism until pushed into a
corner by a growing conservative bloc.
The third social influence is what we called “political polarization,” and leads to the prediction that if one bloc of Justices grows at the expense of another the result will be to push
a Justice in the ideological direction of the group to which he
belongs. Thus, if the Supreme Court becomes more dominated
by, say, Justices appointed by Republican Presidents (an increase in SCRep), those Justices will vote more conservatively
than before but the smaller number of Justices appointed by
Democratic Presidents will vote more liberally. As just noted,
we find this latter effect. In regression (4), if the Court shifts
from a 5–4 majority of Justices appointed by a Democratic
President to a 5–4 majority of Justices appointed by a Republican President, a Justice appointed by a Democratic President
can be expected to vote more liberally in about 3 percent of the
cases (=.244 x 1/8 as SCRep increases from 4/8 to 5/8). But, as
also noted, we find no similar effect when the parties are reversed.
An additional and puzzling point about the social influence
variable is that if we divide the sample into civil liberties cases
and economic cases and re-estimate the regressions in Table 7,
we find a significant negative effect of the SCRep variable in
ethe second category but not the first. That is, the tendency of
Justices appointed by Democratic Presidents to vote more liberally as their number shrinks shows up only in economic
cases. We have no explanation for this finding.
Our regression analysis yields the following additional results:
(1) Justices appointed more recently (YrAppt) are more
likely to vote conservative. But although highly significant
overall (equation (2)), this result appears limited to Justices
appointed by Republican Presidents (equation (3)).
(2) Term (i.e., time-trend) is negative, and is significant
only in the Republican-appointee regressions. The effect is
small—about a .024 increase in the fraction of liberal votes
every three years. The explanation for the effect and its small
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size may be that what is moving the Court in a conservative
direction is the ideology of the appointees. That effect is picked
up in YrApt, so that the small negative effect of Term may be
reflecting the less conservative drift of society than the more
conservative drift of judges appointed by Republican presidents. The former may have an independent effect on the Justices because they do not want to get too far out of step with
public opinion.
(3) Supreme Court Justices appointed from the federal
courts of appeals vote more liberally than other Justices. The
magnitude of this effect is large and significant in all the regressions. The fraction of conservative votes falls by .07, and
since the mean of the fraction of conservative votes in all categories is .47, a decline of .07 translates into a percentage decline of 15 percent. A possible explanation is that judges socialized into the judicial role by prior appellate experience on a
lower court that is bound to conform to Supreme Court precedent become more respectful of stare decisis (decision making
based on precedent), and the most controversial precedents are
the liberal decisions of the Warren Court and, to a lesser extent, of the Burger Court.
C. Other Behavior of Supreme Court Justices.
We now regress such outcome variables as fractions of dissents, concurrences, one-vote decisions, and reversals on independent variables that include the fraction of nonunanimous
conservative votes of the median Justice (a measure of the median Justice’s ideology), the difference between the Justice with
the maximum and the Justice with the minimum of the fraction of nonunanimous conservative votes among Justices in a
given term (a proxy for the range of ideological differences
among Justices), the number of new Justices and Justices’
length of tenure, the number of cases per term of Court, and a
time-trend variables. The data cover the 1937 to 2004 period.
Table 8 explains the variables and reports their means.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Although we do not have a complete model of judicial decision-making, we suspect that any such model would predict, for
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example, that the greater the ideological differences among
Justices, the greater the fraction of close decisions.20 A more
ideologically divided court is less likely to be able to coalesce
around a single opinion in each case.
Table 9 presents the regression results. The dependent
variables are the fraction of dissents (regressions (1) and
(2)—the dependent variable is the same in both regressions but
(2) has an additional independent variable), the fraction of concurrences (regression (3)), the fraction of cases decided by one
vote ((4)), and the fraction of reversals ((5)) in the 1937 to 2004
terms (although data on reversals begin in 1946).
[Insert Table 9 here]
Regressions (1) and (2) reveal a positive and statistically
significant correlation between the fraction of cases in which
there is a dissent and the fraction in which there is a concurrence. Causation, however, is unclear. One might have expected concurrences and dissents to be substitutes; we find
them to be complements. The explanation may be that ideological differences generate not only dissents but also concurrences, the former reflecting disagreement over the outcome,
and latter disagreement over the grounds for the outcome. Absence of dissent aversion may also be a factor that reduces the
substitutability of a concurrence for a dissent.
Other results of the regression analysis in Table 9 are as
follows:
(1) The ideology of the ideologically median Justice has a
significant effect on the fraction of decisions with dissenting
opinions (regressions (1)) and the fraction of reversals (regression (4)). We find that the more conservative the median Justice, the greater the fraction of cases with dissenting opinions
but the lower the fraction of reversals. This suggests that
lower-court judges tend to be conservative, since the reversal
rate is a measure of the disagreement between the Supreme
Court and the courts whose decisions it is reviewing. We shall
20

Although in a case decided by one vote there necessarily is at least one
dissent, the mean proportion of cases with dissenting opinions is 58 percent,
whereas the mean proportion of cases decided by one vote is only 15 percent.
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suggest an explanation for this result when we discuss the
court of appeals cases.
(2) The greater the range of potential disagreement among
Justices (as proxied by the difference between the maximum
and minimum conservative votes per term), the greater the
fraction of dissents and of cases decided by one vote. These results are highly significant in regressions (1) and (3) and are in
the predicted direction. The range variable has no significant
effect on reversals (regression (4)), but this is not too surprising
because why should the reversal rate be related not to the ideology of the median judge but to the amount of ideological disagreement on the Court? But it is a little surprising because a
polarized Court may be quite unpredictable. That is the situation today, with pretty solid blocs of four liberals and four conservatives and a moderate Justice (Kennedy) who swings between them, though more often to the conservative side.
(3) Contrary to what one might have expected, there is a
negative time trend in the fraction of dissents (regression (1)),
implying a decline in disagreement among the Justices, holding ideological differences constant (the range variable). But
the fraction of concurrences has increased significantly, suggesting an increase in disagreements over the reasoning in the
majority opinion as distinct from disagreements over outcome.
Since we are holding ideological differences constant, the implication is that even ideological allies are finding it more difficult to agree on the grounds of decision.
(4) The number of cases per term is positively and significantly related to the fraction both of concurrences and of reversals but not to the fraction of dissents. The correlation with reversals makes economic sense. The more disagreement there is
between the Supreme Court and lower courts, the more cases
the Court has to take (its jurisdiction is discretionary) in order
to enforce its views on those courts. A related point is that most
Supreme Court decisions are reversals of the lower court, and
many of the affirmances are in cases in which there is a circuit
split, meaning that in affirming one decision the Supreme
Court is disapproving (and thus in effect overruling) a decision
or decisions in another circuit or other circuits.
This is an illustration of management by exception, a practice emphasized in the literature on the economics of organiza-
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tions. To economize on skilled employees, routine problems are
left to subordinate employees to resolve, but the nonroutine are
bounced up to higher levels. When the Supreme Court reverses
a lower-court decision, it in effect “corrects” the mistakes made
by a subordinate. The more “mistakes” the subordinates make,
the more frequently the superiors must intervene; hence the
positive correlation between cases heard by the Supreme Court
and percentage of reversals. In this analysis the Supreme
Court Justices are principals and the lower-court judges are
their agents, who have to be kept in line to minimize agency
costs.
The effect of the number of cases that the Court hears on
the number of concurrences may seem puzzling because the
more cases there are, the less time the Justices have to write
separate opinions. But the increase in the number of law clerks
may have offset this effect. More interesting, an increase in
concurrences may reflect a desire to provide more guidance to
lower courts, since concurring opinions by the Supreme Court
often are influential with the lower courts. In effect, concurrences act as multipliers of number of cases heard by the Court
and so help to minimize agency costs.
(5) We find no significant effects of number of new Justices
or of average tenure on the outcome variables.
IV. ANALYSIS OF COURT OF APPEALS VOTING: 1925–2002
A. Data Summary.
The court of appeals (Songer) database contains random
samples of 15 decisions from each federal court of appeals annually from 1925 through 1960, and of 30 decisions annually
from 1961 through 2002.21 Our corrected database includes 536
judges and 48,161 votes—an average of 90 votes per judge.
These votes are classified in four ideological categories (conservative, liberal, mixed, and other) and eight subject-matter categories (criminal, civil rights, first amendment, due process, privacy, economic regulation, labor, and—a residual category—miscellaneous). Recall that the “other” category consists
21

The data are limited to the 12 regional circuits. The Federal Circuit, created in 1982 with a semi-specialized jurisdiction, is omitted.
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of votes that can be classified by subject matter but that have
no ascertainable ideological hue. Although we exclude “other”
votes from the regression analysis, it is useful to note its magnitude since many of our corrections to the court of appeals database involved shifting votes into that category. Table 10
shows that about 25 percent of the votes in the database are in
the “other” class.
[Insert Table 10 here]
The average of 90 votes per judge hides the fact that there are
fewer votes for those judges appointed before 1925, the first
sample year, and for those judges appointed not long before
2002, because both sets of judges cast relatively few votes in the
period covered by the database Thus, of the 58 judges with
fewer than 20 votes (including 3 with zero votes), 10 were appointed before 1925 and 27 after 1990. Figure 3 shows the distribution of votes by the year in which the judge was appointed.

Table 11 relates the percentage of judges’ votes in the different subject-matter and ideological categories to the party of the
appointing President. We see that judges appointed by Republican Presidents are indeed more likely to vote conservative, with
the imbalance being greater among judges appointed by the
most recent Republican Presidents—Reagan and the two
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Bushes.22 The data in Table 11 also reveal a positive time trend
in the fraction of conservative votes regardless of the party of
the appointing President, though this finding must be taken
with caution because of the high error rate in the ideological
classification of votes in older cases.23 The time trend is observed even if we exclude criminal appeals, which yield a high
proportion of conservative votes for both Republican and Democratic appointees. The overwhelming majority of criminal
appeals are by criminal defendants whose appeals are financed
by the government, and with the cost of appealing thus being
zero to most criminal defendants, there is a high percentage of
groundless criminal appeals.
[Insert Table 11 here]
We cannot meaningfully compare the fraction of conservative votes in all cases in the courts of appeals sample with the
corresponding fraction in the Supreme Court because the two
judiciaries have a different mixture of cases. We might hope at
least to compare the constitutional cases in the two databases,
since they are such a large part of the Supreme Court caseload,
and a significant part of the court of appeals caseload. We cannot do that exactly, because the categories in the two databases
are different, but a satisfactory approximation is to compare
votes in the civil liberties category that we used for the Supreme Court (see Table 5) to votes in the constitutional category (civil rights, First Amendment, due process, and privacy)
for the court of appeals. The result is striking: The fraction of
conservative votes is significantly higher for the court of appeals judges, whether appointed by Republican or Democratic
Presidents, than for Supreme Court Justices. The ratios of conservative to liberal votes in the constitutional category in the
courts of appeal are 1.84 to 1 for judges appointed by Republican Presidents and 1.24 to 1 for judges appointed by Democ22

The sum of the fraction of conservative and liberal votes is less than one
because of mixed votes, which account for between 5 and 10 percent of the
votes.
23 Recall from note 6 above that a spot check of appellate cases found a 40
percent error rate in classifications of cases decided between 1925 and 1940,
compared to only a 10 percent rate for cases decided since 1960.
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ratic Presidents, while the corresponding ratios of conservative
to liberal votes in the Supreme Court are 1.33 to 1 for judges
appointed by Republican Presidents and .82 to 1 for judges appointed by Democratic Presidents.
The likeliest reason for the difference is a selection effect
similar to the one that explains the tendency of liberals to cast
conservative votes in criminal cases. The liberal side of a civil
case is generally the plaintiff's side. Most cases are losers—for
example, most employment discrimination cases (a major category of civil rights cases) are dismissed and the dismissal affirmed. The affirmance of a civil rights case that has been dismissed, as of most civil cases in which the defendant won in the
district court, is classified as a conservative vote. So, since most
dismissals of civil rights cases would be affirmed by any judge
who was not ultraliberal, even liberals vote conservative in a
large fraction of civil cases. The situation in the Supreme Court
is different. Any litigant who loses in the district court can appeal to the court of appeals, but the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is discretionary and the Court agrees to hear only a tiny
percentage (currently only slightly more than one-tenth of 1
percent24) of the cases decided by the courts of appeals. The
cases the Court accepts for review tend to be the more meritorious cases (one indication of this is that the Court reverses more
than three-fourths of the cases it decides; the reversal rates in
the courts of appeals are much lower), since if the court of appeals had affirmed an obvious loser, the Supreme Court would
rarely bother to take the case. Being more meritorious on average, the civil rights cases decided by the Supreme Court receive
a higher fraction of liberal votes than the average court of appeals case does.
B. Regression Analysis.
Most of our independent variables are the same as in Table
6. But some are new, including the dummy variables denoting
the judge’s circuit (Cir), gender (Gend), race (Black), and prior
experience as a district judge (Dist).25 There have been too few
24

Posner, note 3 above, ch. 10.
We include 11 CIR dummy variables for the 12 circuits (the left out variable is the D.C. circuit); GEND equals 1 for a male and 0 for a female judge;
25
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black and female Supreme Court Justices (just two of each) to
enable meaningful comparisons with other Justices (and virtually no Justices who had been district judges), whereas 8.4 percent of our court of appeals sample (45) consists of female
judges and 4.4 percent (24) of black judges, along with a substantial percentage—42.7 percent—of former district court
judges. Over the period embraced by the sample, the percentage of court of appeals judges who are former district judges
has declined from 46 percent to 32 percent. This decline is not,
as one might have thought, due to an increase in the number of
female and black judges, who are appointed from a smaller and
presumably younger (because until relatively recently there
were few black or female federal judges) pool of eligible candidates and so are less likely, one might think, to have been district judges. Of the 41 black or female court of appeals judges
serving currently, 37 percent had been district judges, compared to only 30 percent of the white male court of appeals
judges.
There are several differences between the Supreme Court
and court of appeals regressions. They are due to differences
between the two databases that have required us to tabulate
our court of appeals vote data in the form of votes per judge
over the sample period rather than votes per year and have
prevented us from distinguishing between majority and dissenting votes. Also, because the data are sampled (15 cases per
court of appeals through 1960 and 30 per court of appeals
thereafter), there may be no or only a few cases per judge in
any year, which makes it difficult to study the time path of a
judge’s votes within subject-matter categories.26 And while an
increase in the fraction of conservative votes in the Supreme
Court translates into an identical decrease in the fraction of
liberal votes because there is no “mixed” vote category in the
Supreme Court database, in the court of appeals database such
an increase can lead to a decrease in the fraction of mixed
votes, of liberal votes, or of both. The biggest effect, however, is
BLACK equals 1 for black and 0 otherwise; and DIST equals 1 if the judge
had been a district court judge and 0 otherwise.
26 Notwithstanding the sampling method for the court of appeals, we plan
to do a follow up study that disaggregates the court of appeals data to allow
us to tabulate a judge’s vote each year.
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a decrease in the fraction of liberal votes because, as Table 11
shows, the fraction of mixed votes is only 7.2 percent of all
votes (excluding “other” votes).27
Table 12 presents our regression results for the courts of
appeals. Regressions (1) through (3) are limited to civil cases
(CIV) and (4) through (6) to criminal cases (CRIM). We include
independent variables for the fraction of the judge’s votes (excluding criminal) in economic and labor cases (ECON), and in
the miscellaneous case category (MIS), in order to account for
differences in the mixture of cases across circuits. We estimated separate regressions for criminal cases because conservative votes in this category (that is, votes against the defendant) are more likely to be a reflection of the lack of merit of
these cases than of a judge’s ideological bent. We did not report
a similar division in the Supreme Court because the Court’s
selectivity means that all categories of cases that it decides are
likely to be difficult. Consistent with this suggestion, the fraction of conservative votes in the Supreme Court’s criminal
cases is only slightly higher than the fraction of civil cases—for
example, the fraction of conservative votes in the criminalprocedure category, .535, is near the midpoint of the range of
the other categories, which is .41 to .59 (excluding the tax category, where 34 percent of the votes are conservative).
[Insert Table 12 here]
(1) Consistently with our findings for the Supreme Court,
judges appointed by Republican Presidents (Pres) are significantly more likely to vote for conservative than for liberal outcomes in both the civil and criminal regressions. This is not
surprising because federal court of appeals judges have the
same secure tenure as Supreme Court Justices and so we can
expect their utility function to contain a self-expression argument. We find no effects of the President’s party on the mixed
or other vote categories (regressions (3) and (6)).
(2) As in the Supreme Court regressions, we find that the
greater the fraction of Republican senators (SenRep) at the
27

To verify this assumption, we estimated separate regressions for the fraction of conservative, mixed, and liberal votes.
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time of a judge’s confirmation, the more likely the judge is to
cast conservative votes and the less likely he is to cast liberal
ones. This is true in both the civil and criminal regressions, but
the effects are statistically significant only in the former.
(3) The judge-specific variables (Gend, Black, and Dist) are
not significant in any regression, with the exception that black
appellate judges are significantly less likely to vote conservatively in criminal cases (regression (4)).
(4) Recall that the civil regressions add two variables to
account for possible voting differences in constitutional, economic-regulation, and miscellaneous cases. We find a significantly higher fraction of conservative votes in the miscellaneous class as a result of a decline in the fraction of liberal votes,
but no change in the fraction of mixed votes, and a significantly
higher fraction of liberal votes in the economic-regulation class
that is offset by a decline in the fraction of mixed economic
votes.
We re-estimated the regressions in Table 12 restricting the
sample to judges appointed since 1960. We did this in order to
verify the results from the full sample, because there are fewer
classification errors in the post-1960 period. We do not reproduce these regressions because they do not differ greatly from
the regressions for the full sample. As expected, we are able to
explain more of the variance in the data for the later period.
Thus, in the regression of the fraction of conservative votes in
civil cases, the R2 is .34 in the 1960–2002 period, compared to
.21 for the full sample. The corresponding figures for the criminal cases are .29 in the later period compared to .22 for the full
sample. In addition, all t-ratios for the PRES variable in the
fraction-conservative and fraction-liberal regressions exceed 3
in the 1960–2005 regressions but only one exceeds 3 in the full
sample.
The results in the two sets of regressions differ significantly in three respects:
(1) There is no significant effect of the fraction of Republican senators variable in the 1960–2002 regressions, although
all coefficients have the predicted positive sign.
(2) In 1960–2002 regressions the coefficient for the year-ofappointment variable is positive and highly significant in civil
(though not in criminal) cases, whether the dependent variable
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is fraction of conservative votes, fraction of liberal votes, or
fraction of mixed votes. In other words, judges appointed more
recently (among judges appointed since 1960) are more likely
to cast conservative and mixed votes and less likely to cast liberal ones. These results may reflect an increase in the number
of ideologically committed conservative judges appointed by
Republican Presidents beginning with Reagan. He, followed by
his Republican successors, decided to give less weight to the
preferences of home-state Senators, whose recommendations
often reflect patronage rather than ideological concerns.
To test this hypothesis, we separated the 1960–2002 sample into judges appointed by Republican Presidents (179
judges) and judges appointed by Democratic Presidents (172).
The “more committed conservative” hypothesis implies a positive and significant effect of the appointment year in the Republican but not the Democratic sample. Consistent with this
hypothesis, the regression coefficient on the appointment variable is positive and highly significant (a t-ratio of 3.88) in the
Republican sample but insignificant (a t-ratio of .84) in the
Democratic sample.
(3) In contrast to finding (5) in the civil case regression for
the full sample, we find no significant effects for the two subject-matter variables in the 1960–2002 regressions. The explanation for this difference may lie in the greater number of classification errors in the full sample. If the errors in classifying
the ideological direction of votes in the earlier cases are systematically related to the subject areas, this could produce significant coefficients for the economic and miscellaneous variables in the 1925–2002 but not 1960–2002 regressions.
C. Group Effects (Social Influence)
The circuit dummy variables are jointly significant in all
regressions in Table 12, including the re-estimated regressions
limited to the 1960–2002 subsample, indicating that there are
significant (unexplained) differences among some circuits in
the fraction of conservative, liberal, and mixed votes. These results are summarized in Table 13 for both the 1925–2002 and
1960–2002 regressions, where + indicates a positive and significant correlation between the circuit and the fraction of con-
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servative (or liberal or mixed) votes and – indicates a negative
and significant correlation.
[Insert Table 13]
Although there is no significant circuit effect in Table 13
for most circuits (for example, column (1) indicates that there
are no significant differences among the Second, Third, Fourth,
Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. circuits in the fraction
of conservative votes case in civil cases), there is a pronounced
effect in the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, and smaller effects
in three others (the First, Second, and Fifth).28 In all five circuits in the civil regressions, the circuit effect makes the circuit
more conservative than one would expect on the basis of the
judges’ ideology as proxied by the party of the President who
appointed them and by the fraction of Republican senators at
the time of confirmation. Thus, it is not that these are the five
most conservative circuits, but that they are more conservative
than they “should be” on the basis of the presumed ideology of
their judges, a factor that the regression corrects for. We have
no explanation for this result.
Another reason to observe circuit effects is social influence,
which we discussed with reference to the Supreme Court. We
tested three possible social-influence hypotheses—a conformity
hypothesis, a group-polarization hypothesis, and politicalpolarization effect—and found that only the third was supported by the data. We now test these hypotheses in the courts
of appeals by examining the voting behavior of the current (as
of 2002) active court of appeals judges, plus those who have
taken senior status, retired, or resigned since 2000, for they
would have interacted extensively with the current active
judges. Our sample contains 154 judges, 141 appointed since
1980, with 81 appointed by Republican Presidents, and 75 appointed by Democratic Presidents. The former group has an
average tenure of 14.8 years and the latter 10.5 years. Re28

Technically, the circuit dummies indicate the difference between
circuit and the D.C. Circuit, which is the excluded dummy variable.
implies that if seven circuits are not significantly different than the
circuit whereas four are, then the latter four are significantly different
the eight other circuits.
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stricting the analysis to this sample provides a more powerful
test of our two social-influence hypotheses than either the
1925–2002 or 1960–2002 samples. Judges currently active in a
circuit (plus other judges appointed after 1960 who were active
as of 2000 but not 2002) by definition interact with each other,
whereas many of the judges in the same circuit in the
1925–2002 and 1960–2002 samples did not overlap, given the
length of time covered by each sample.
Table 14 re-estimates the regressions in Table 12 but is
limited to current judges and contains two alternative independent variables for social influence.29 One is the fraction of
judges in each circuit who were appointed by Republican
Presidents (FrRep); the other is that fraction weighted by the
number of years of a judge’s service through 2002 (FrRep_wtd).
Because the court of appeals judges almost always sit in panels
of three judges randomly selected from the judges on the court
(though a complicating factor, which we ignore, is that a number of the courts of appeals make extensive use of visiting
judges, mainly senior judges), an increase in FrRep implies a
higher probability that a panel will include two or more judges
appointed by Republican Presidents.
Thus, of the 11 judges in the Seventh Circuit in the sample
of current judges, Republican Presidents appointed eight and
Democratic Presidents three. This implies that the probability
that a judge appointed by a Republican President will sit on a
panel with at least one or two other judges appointed by a Republican President is .933, while the probability that he will sit
on a panel of two judges appointed by Democratic Presidents is
only .063. In comparison, a judge appointed by a Democratic
President in the seventh circuit has a .62 probability that he
29

With regard to the other variables in Table 14, that is, variables carried
over from Table 12, the results are similar to those for the 1960–2005 sample in that table. Thus, judges appointed by Republican Presidents are significantly more likely to vote conservatively; judges appointed by Republican Presidents in their second term are less likely to vote conservatively in
civil cases than those appointed in the first term; and the fraction of conservative votes is significantly lower in economic-regulation than in other civil
cases. None of the other variables in Table 14 that were carried over from
Table 12 is statistically significant, except the second-term Democratic
variable in the criminal regression, which has a positive and (barely) significant effect.
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will sit on a panel with one or two other judges appointed by a
Democratic President.30 Group effects in the court of appeals
thus are panel-composition effects.31
The conformity hypothesis is that an increase in the proportion of judges appointed by Republican Presidents will increase the likelihood that any judge in the circuit will cast a
conservative vote and that a decrease in that proportion will
increase the likelihood of a liberal vote. The group-polarization
hypothesis is that judges appointed by Republican Presidents
will vote more conservatively in response to an increase in the
fraction of the judges on their court appointed by Republican
Presidents but that judges appointed by Democratic Presidents
will not. The political-polarization hypothesis is that an increase in the size of one of the blocs relative to another will
cause the second to vote more antagonistically to the first. We
test the first hypothesis by estimating a regression for all 154
judges in the sample. We test the second and third hypotheses
by estimating separate regressions for judges appointed by Republican Presidents and judges appointed by Democratic
Presidents.
[Insert Table 14 here]
The dependent variable in the first two regressions in Table 14 is the fraction of conservative votes in civil cases and the
dependent variable in the third and fourth regressions is the
fraction of conservative votes in criminal cases. In contrast to
30

More generally, we can calculate the probabilities of various panel compositions for a given judge as follows. Let N=the number of judges in the
circuit; R=the number appointed by Republican Presidents and D=the
number appointed by Democratic Presidents.
Panel
Make-Up
All R
2R & 1D
1R & 2D
All D
31

Judge Appointed by Republican President
(R–1)(R–2)/(N–1)(N–2)
[(R–1)(R–2) + 2(R–1)D]/(N–1)(N–2)
D(D—1)/(N–1)(N–2)
0

Judge Appointed by Democratic President
0
R(R–1)/(N–1)(N—2)
[(D–1)(D–2) + 2(D–1)R]/(N–1)(N–2)
(D–1)(D–2)/(N–1)(N–2)

See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis
of the Federal Judiciary (2006)
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our finding with respect to the Supreme Court, we find in our
court of appeals sample a significant increase in the likelihood
that a judge will vote conservatively in both civil and criminal
cases the greater the fraction of judges appointed by Republican Presidents, regardless of whether the judge in question
was appointed by a Republican or a Democratic President.32 So
the conformity hypothesis is supported. The effect is greater in
the case of judges appointed by Democratic Presidents than in
the case of judges appointed by Republican Presidents. For in
the separate civil regressions (not reported in Table 14), the
coefficients (t-ratios in parentheses) are .202 (2.68) and .285
(3.08) for judges appointed by Republican and by Democratic
Presidents respectively, and in the separate criminal regressions they are .339 (3.20) and .546 (5.11). These results are
merely suggestive, however, because we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the effects are equal.
We can estimate the magnitude of the effect of marginally
changing the fraction of court of appeals judges appointed by
Republican and Democratic Presidents. Suppose in a circuit
that has 6 judges appointed by Republican Presidents and 6
appointed by Democratic Presidents, one of the judges that had
been appointed by a Democratic President is replaced by a
judge appointed by a Republican President—i.e., the FrRep
variable changes from .5 (6/12) to .5833 (7/12). The mean value
of the fraction of conservative votes in civil cases for the average judge will increase from .52 to .54 (.221 _ (.5833 – .5)) in
civil cases and from .74 to .78 in criminal cases (.438 _ (.5833 –
.5)). In a ten-year period, assuming an equal number of civil
and criminal cases, the average judge would thus cast 20 more
conservative votes in civil cases and 40 more conservative votes
in criminal cases.
There is also some evidence of group polarization. Remember that an increase in the fraction of judges appointed by a
Republican President increases the conservative voting of those
32

Recall that votes in the court of appeals are classified as conservative,
mixed or liberal so that an increase in conservative votes does not necessarily imply a decrease in liberal votes. We re-estimated the regressions in Table 14 using the fraction of liberal votes as the dependent variable and
found that the greater FrRep and FrRep_wtd, the lower the fraction of liberal votes.
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judges, not just of the judges appointed by a Democratic President. In other words, the in-group becomes more extreme.
There is thus a triple effect of a change in the ideological composition of a court when a member of the minority bloc on the
court (say judges appointed by Democratic Presidents) is replaced by a member of the majority bloc: The majority becomes
larger and therefore the court becomes more conservative irrespective of any group effects; the members of the majority become more conservative than they were when there were fewer
of them; and the minority becomes more docile—more likely to
go along with the majority than before. This triple whammy
suggests that judicial confirmation battles will be most intense
when the appointment would result in enlarging the majority
bloc on the court of appeals at the expense of the minority.
So the conformity hypothesis is supported, but so is the
group-polarization hypothesis, because the size of the “in
group” (judges appointed by Republican Presidents, or judges
appointed by Democratic Presidents) has an independent effect
on the fraction of conservative (or liberal, as the case may be)
votes.
The political-polarization effect, which we found supported
by the Supreme Court data, is not supported by the court of
appeals data. This is implied by the finding of a conformity effect in the court of appeals but not in the Supreme Court.
Given the conformity effect, when one bloc of judges grows at
the expense of the other (that is, holding the size of the court
constant), the entire court is pushed in the ideological direction
of the group that has grown, at least if that group is in the
majority. We offer the following possible economic explanation
for the difference between the Supreme Court and the courts of
appeals regarding the conformity effect. The workload of the
courts of appeals is heavier than that of the Supreme Court,
because the Supreme Court has a discretionary jurisdiction,
which enables it to limit its caseload; the jurisdiction of the
courts of appeals is almost entirely mandatory. Especially
given leisure preference, the heavier workload in the courts of
appeals makes the cost of a dissent greater for court of appeals
judges than for Supreme Court Justices. The heavier workload
also increases the benefits of decision according to precedent,
which greatly reduces the time and effort involved in a deci-
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sion; instead of having to analyze the case from the ground up,
the court looks for a very similar previous case and decides the
new case the same way. So we can expect decision in accordance with precedent to be more valued in the courts of appeals. That reduces the value of a dissent, because the majority
vote will establish the precedent and the dissent will usually
have no influence on the law. Because decision in accordance
with precedent is less important in the Supreme Court, dissents have more influence because future Justices are less inhibited than courts of appeals judges would be about departing
from a precedent in favor of a dissent. In addition, selfexpression is a more powerful motivator in the Supreme Court
because the Court is more powerful than a court of appeals.33
Given that a Justice’s cost-benefit analysis is likely to favor dissenting more than a court of appeals judge’s does, we
can expect, as we find, a conformity effect in the courts of appeals but not in the Supreme Court. When a court of appeals is
closely divided between liberal and conservative blocs, panels
tend to be balanced and a draft of a dissent may swing one of
the other judges over to the dissenter’s side; and published dissents may signal support for like-minded judges not on the particular panel and provide ideas that may fructify in subsequent
cases. The more one-sided the court, the less the value of dissenting. In the limit, in a court of say 10 conservative judges
and 1 liberal one, the liberal’s dissents would have virtually no
impact on the law. Moreover, if he stuck to his liberal guns,
consistency might require him to dissent so often that he would
be overloaded with work. Hence the conformity effect.

33

“The cases the Court hears tend to arouse strong emotions. And the Justices have a lighter workload than lower-court judges, are more in the public eye and therefore more concerned with projecting a coherent judicial
philosophy, and are more likely to influence the law even when dissenting,
because of the instability of Supreme Court precedent as a consequence of
the greater stakes in the cases that the Court decides and the absence of
review by a higher court.” Posner, note 3 above, ch. 1. See also James F.
Spriggs and Thomas G. Hansford, “Explaining the Overruling of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent,” 63 Journal of Politics 1091 (2001), finding that the
Supreme Court is more likely to overrule a prior nonunanimous decision
than a prior unanimous one.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The principal methodological contribution of this paper is
the correction of a number of systematic errors in the ideological classification of Supreme Court and court of appeals decisions—errors such as classifying all judicial votes for the plaintiff in an intellectual property case as a liberal outcome—in the
Spaeth (1953 to 2000, Supreme Court) and Songer (1925 to
2002, courts of appeals) databases; in addition we identified
errors in the Songer database in ideological classification of individual outcomes of cases decided before 1960. The two databases have been used in a large number of previous studies
(see Appendix A); our corrections enable more accurate statistical measurements and analyses. The corrections are limited
to the systematic errors, but our separate analyses of the post1960 cases enable us to eliminate most of the individual case
errors as well. Another methodological contribution is the
study of group effects in a real-world group rather than a group
contrived for experimental purposes.
We analyzed the Supreme Court and court of appeals data
separately, using where feasible an informal economic model to
explain some of our results. With regard to the Supreme Court
we found that our ideology measure (the corrected version of
the ideological measure in the Spaeth database) corresponds
closely though not identically to what “everyone knows” is the
ideological rank order of the Justices who served between 1953
and 2002. We also found, consistent with many other studies,
that Justices appointed by Republican Presidents vote more
conservatively than Justices appointed by Democratic Presidents, with the difference being most pronounced in civil-rights
cases and least pronounced in privacy and judicial-power cases.
We related to this finding to the “self-expression” argument
that we posit in the federal judicial utility function.
We used regression analysis to try to isolate the causes of
various aspects of the judicial behavior of Supreme Court Justices, beginning with their ideological voting. We found, for example, that some though by no means all Justices become more
conservative and others more liberal during their time on the
Court. This “ideology drift” is consistent with the correlation
between the appointing President’s party and a Justice’s ideology, because over time issues and party ideologies change. A
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challenge for further research is to determine whether it is the
Justice’s ideology that changes over time or that of the party of
the appointing President, or perhaps the ideological character
of the cases.
We find no dissent aversion on the part of Supreme Court
Justices and therefore no tendency for members of a liberal or
conservative minority on the Court to go along with the majority the larger that majority is. That is, we find no conformity
effect. Nor do we find a group-polarization effect, though it is
notable that we find a political-polarization effect among Justices appointed by Democratic but not by Republican Presidents: The fewer of them there are, the more liberally they
vote. This finding is consistent with the proposition that there
is more ideological intensity or commitment among conservatives than among liberals, for the more committed a person is
to a particular view the less likely he is to be influenced by persons holding other views. (An alternative interpretation, however, is that as the Court becomes more conservative, the majority produces more decisions that the liberal minority disagrees with.) There is further evidence of the greater ideological commitment of presumptively conservative judges in our
finding that an increase in the fraction of Republican Senators
results in more conservative voting by Justices appointed by
Democratic Presidents but that there is no parallel effect of
Democratic Senators on Justices appointed by Republican
Presidents.
Another finding is that, other things being equal, Justices
appointed from the federal courts of appeals vote more liberally
than other Justices. We speculate that this is because these
Justices have been socialized by their lower-court experience to
be respectful of precedent, and the most controversial Supreme
Court precedents are those created in the liberal Warren Court
era.
Examining nonideological aspects of the Supreme Court’s
behavior, we found among other things that the number of
cases the Court decides is increasing in the fraction of the
Court’s decisions that reverse the lower court. This makes
sense because the greater the disagreement between lower
courts and Supreme Court, the more cases the Court must hear
in order to enforce its views on the lower courts. This is an ef-
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fect of what organizational economists refer to as “management
by exception.”
Regarding court of appeals judges, we found among other
things that the fraction of conservative votes cast is much
higher in the courts of appeals than in the Supreme Court,
even for judges appointed by Democratic Presidents. We attribute the difference to a selection effect—the courts of appeals, which have a mandatory rather than a discretionary jurisdiction, decide a great many one-sided cases; the Supreme
Court decides more evenly balanced cases because the onesided ones tend not to present significant issues and the
Court’s decisional capacity is very limited relative to the number of lower-court decisions. The difference is especially pronounced in criminal cases. Most criminal appeals are subsidized and lack merit, so that even liberal judges usually vote to
affirm; hence the study of ideological influences in the federal
courts of appeals is better focused on civil than on all appeals.
But the Supreme Court only agrees to hear criminal appeals
that have substantial merit.
Perhaps the most interesting finding in our court of appeals regressions is of both a conformity effect and group polarization. Thus there is a triple effect when, holding the size of
a court of appeals constant, a judge appointed by a President of
one party is replaced by a judge appointed by a President of the
other party and the newly appointed judge is part of the majority bloc on the court. If, for example, the majority consists of
judges appointed by Republican Presidents, a more conservative judge will replace a less conservative one, the members of
the majority bloc will vote more conservatively than when
there were fewer of them, and the members of the minority will
vote more conservatively than when there were more of them.
We speculate that the difference in conformist behavior between the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals is due to
the stronger commitment of the courts of appeals to stare decisis, as a result of which a dissent (say by a liberal on a conservative panel) has less effect in those courts on the precedential effect of a decision. With fewer dissents, a conservative
(liberal) minority will tend to vote more with the liberal (conservative) majority, or in other words to conform to the majority, which is the conformity effect that we find in the courts of
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appeals but not in the Supreme Court. We explain the different
role of precedent in the two judicial tiers by reference to differences in costs and benefits resulting mainly from differences in
workload pressures.
There is much additional work that could be done to refine
our analysis. We suggest just two projects, in closing: The first
would be to identify from media accounts court of appeals
judges who have had good prospects for promotion to the Supreme Court, based on media speculation, and see whether
they dissent more than their peers, or otherwise behave differently, in order to attract attention or otherwise enhance their
promotion prospects. The second project would be to use number of amicus curiae briefs filed in Supreme Court cases as
proxies for the importance of case, which could be used as a
variable to attempt to explain the likelihood of dissent, on the
theory that the value of judicial self-expression through dissenting from a decision with which he disagrees is greater, the
more important the case.
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APPENDIX B—THE ORIGINAL SPAETH AND SONGER
DATABASES
I. THE SPAETH DATABASE
The United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, compiled
by Harold J. Spaeth, contains data for all Supreme Court decisions
in the 1953 through 2006 terms in which at least one Justice wrote
an opinion. The data include the Justices’ votes in each of the cases
plus the identification of the case plus the chronology of the litigation
information, outcomes and issues, and information concerning opinions (e.g., whether majority, dissenting, or concurring).
There are three databases concerning the attributes of the Justices of, respectively, the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts,
covering the period 1953–2000. There are separate observations for
each Justice, indicating for example where he deviates from the majority in identifying issues or authorities.
II. THE SONGER DATABASE
The data in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database (the “Songer”
database) include the history of a case, the participants, the issues
involved, the resolution, the judges who decided the case, and each
judge’s vote on a maximum of two issues in the case. The database
consists, for the years 1925–1960, of a random sample of 15 cases
from each court each year and for the years 1961–2002 of a random
sample of 30 cases from each court each year.
We merged the Songer database with what is known as the
“Auburn” dataset,34 which contains attribute data for the judges in
the Songer database. Although the two databases were intended to
be used together, there were some inconsistencies in the judge identi34

See note 4 above.
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fication codes. We made the corrections suggested by the Songer
documentation and made further corrections as we discovered errors
while working with the data. (These corrections are separate from
those discussed in Appendix B.) We continue to describe the combined databases as the Songer database.
APPENDIX C—THE CORRECTED DATABASES
I. THE SPAETH DATABASE
All observations containing the following codes for the variable
ISSUE were altered so that all judges’ votes were coded as “other”
rather than conservative or liberal. We made these changes on the
basis of the description of the type of issue from “The Supreme Court
Justice-Centered Judicial Databases: the Warren, Burger, and
Rehnquist Courts (1953-2000 Terms): Documentation.”
All votes in case types 411 and 444 we changed to other. A vote
for the plaintiff on an issue of commercial speech (excluding attorneys) (411) had been coded as liberal; also a vote in favor of requiring
accountability in campaign spending (444).
On issues pertaining to unions, votes in case types 555, 563, and
581 were changed because in antitrust cases against unions (555) a
pro-competition vote had been coded as liberal, though some liberal
judges would put union interests ahead of the competition interest
enforced by antitrust law. In disputes between a union and a union
member (563), a vote against the union member had been coded as
liberal, and in disputes in cases involving jurisdictional disputes between (581), a pro-union vote had been coded as liberal. These seem
arbitrary classifications.
On issues pertaining to the propriety of federal judicial review of
state court or federal administrative actions, we changed all votes in
case types 706, 712, 751, 755, 759, 855, 856, 862–864, 868, 869, and
899 from liberal to other. Originally, votes on any of these issues for
judicial power or “activism” were coded as liberal. These case types
covered judicial power with respect to obscenity (706), comity and
civil procedure (712), determination that a writ was improvidently
granted (751), remanding a case to determine the basis of a state
court decision (755), miscellaneous no-merits votes (759), jurisdiction
or authority of the Court of Claims (855), the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction (856), certification (862), resolution of circuit conflicts
(863), objections to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal (864), the
Act of State doctrine (868), miscellaneous judicial-administration issues (869), and miscellaneous exercises of judicial power (899). Despite the number of changes that we made in the Spaeth database,
Table 2 indicates that the aggregate effect on ideological classification of Supreme Court Justices’ votes was less than in the courts of
appeals.
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II. THE SONGER DATABASE
We made the following changes to the coding of “vote directionality” (i.e., the ideological valence of the judge’s vote) in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals database. All votes in case types 114–118,
134–138, and 154–158 were changed from liberal or conservative to
“other”—that is, the outcome cannot be coded as liberal or conservative. According to the database documentation, all votes in criminal
cases for the defendant were coded as liberal. We changed moral
charges (114, 134, and 154) to “other” because they could include
child pornography, an issue on which neither liberal nor conservative
judges would be likely to be sympathetic to the defendant. The other
changes were economic crimes (violations of government regulations
of business, other white collar crime, and other crimes), in which a
liberal judge would tend to favor the government rather than the defendant.
Votes for the plaintiff in non-employment-related sex discrimination cases brought by a man (235), classified by the original coders
as liberal, we changed to “other” because the category could include
cases in which the plaintiff was harassed by another man because he
(the plaintiff) was homosexual or suspected of being homosexual, and
in such a case a liberal judge would tend to favor the plaintiff, perhaps also if the man were alleging harassment by a woman. Suits
charging on race or sex discrimination in employment (239) we also
changed from liberal to “other” because like the closely related category 235, category 239 is too broad from an ideological standpoint; it
could (and doubtless does) include claims of discrimination by whites
and men against blacks and women in cases of affirmative action.
Commercial speech cases (301) had been coded so that a vote for
the broadest interpretation of First Amendment protection was liberal. We changed this to “other” because businesses typically assert
claims of commercial speech. In obscenity cases (307), where again a
vote for the broadest interpretation of First Amendment protection
had been coded as liberal, we changed the coding to “other” because
some liberals (especially feminists) disapprove of obscenity and, as
with criminal charges, few judges would have sympathy for a First
Amendment claim based on child pornography, which is classified
under obscenity.
In the original database, case type 412 was described as a
claimed “denial of due process under the ‘taking’ clause of the Fifth
Amendment,” and a vote for the plaintiff was coded as liberal. Yet in
case type 771—eminent domain disputes with government—a vote
for the government is coded as liberal. Due process is not mentioned
in the taking clause, so case type 412 is mysterious and we thought it
better to shift the votes in it to the “other” category.
Votes for plaintiffs in the general category of labor relations
were changed from liberal to other if the parties involved were on
one side (1) the executive branch of the government and on the other
side (2) a union or an individual. This changed all the votes in case
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types 600–699. We made a similar change for all votes in categories
710–713, which cover copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade secrets,
and personal intellectual property. All votes for the plaintiffs in such
cases had been coded liberal. Yet an intellectual property case often
is brought by a large firm against a small firm or an individual, as
when a giant pharmaceutical company sues the manufacturer of a
generic drug or a large record company sues a file-sharing college
student to make an example of him.
We made a similar reclassification of votes in case types
773–774, which involve the government’s seizure of property either
as an incident to the enforcement of criminal statutes (773) or in civil
cases (774). All votes for the government in these categories had
been coded liberal, but because the party whose property is seized
could either be wealthy or poor, the ideological classification was
overbroad.
Votes in all cases in type 903 we likewise changed from liberal to
other. This case type is described only as “attorneys (disbarment,
etc.).” There is no reason to expect a liberal judge to favor a lawyer in
a disbarment proceeding.
Votes in all cases in types 905, 906, and 920 were changed to
other, as the issues in these cases—challenges to the authority of a
magistrate or bankruptcy judge, and international law—do not lend
themselves to being categorized on ideological lines.
We recoded the cases in type 921, government regulation of immigration, from liberal to conservative. A vote for government regulation had been coded as liberal, but a liberal judge would be likely to
support the rights of the immigrant against the government rather
than vice versa.
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TABLE 1
VOTES BY SUPREME COURT JUDGES IN NONUNANIMOUS CASES:
1937–2006
Civil Liberties
Uncorrected
Total
Other
Corrected
Total
Other

Economic/labor/tax

All

41,032
184

19,438
13

60,470
197

39,228
2,004

18,936
506

58,164
2,510

Notes: (1) Civil liberties includes criminal procedure, civil rights, first amendment, due process,
privacy, attorneys, federalism and judicial power.
(2) In both the corrected and uncorrected data, we excluded several hundred miscellaneous and interstate relations votes, because, in the former, we could not classify the
subject matter, and, in the latter, because the ideological direction of the votes are
indeterminate.

TABLE 2
VOTES BY FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS JUDGES 1925–2002
Criminal

Uncorrected
Total
Other
Corrected
Total
Other

Constitutional

Econ/labor

Miscellaneous

All

16677
65

8234
117

30849
5081

1737
503

57497
5766

10721
6024

7849
502

28375
7561

1216
1058

48161
15145

Notes: (1) Total is net of votes that are not classified ideologically (“other”).
(2) In the corrected data, we are not able to classify the subject matter for 492 votes.
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TABLE 3
FRACTION OF CONSERVATIVE VOTES IN NONUNANIMOUS CASES: 1937–2006 TERMS
FOR 43 SUPREME COURT JUSTICES RANKED FROM MORE TO LESS CONSERVATIVE
Fraction Conservative Votes1
Other Ideology MeasJustice
Mean
ures5
Votes
All
Civ.
Econ
Adj.
S/C
M/Q
Adj
Per
Lib
Civ
Score Score3 .Civ
2
Term
Lib.
Lib.4
Thomas
.822
.841
.751
.884
52.69
.840
3.65
.765
Rehnquist
.815
.864
.630
.891
87.09
.955
2.77
.774
Scalia
.757
.791
.625
.820
65.57
1
2.57
.724
Roberts
.753
.767
.700
.804
46.5
.880
1.54
Alito
.740
.754
.688
.860
36.5
.900
1.46
Burger
.735
.771
.607
.790
118.29
1
1.79
.711
O’Connor
.680
.687
.653
.709
83.75
.585
.86
.632
Powell
.677
.694
.609
.700
106.81
.835
.91
.627
Whittaker
.673
.682
.660
.696
79.50
.500
1.22
.562
Kennedy
.647
.671
.556
.707
59.0
.635
.80
.623
Harlan
.628
.656
.560
.649
100.12
.125
1.59
.533
Vinson
.613
.693
.510
.723
83.86
.250
.97
.634
Burton
.587
.669
.482
.673
84.64
.720
1.00
.614
Minton
.587
.710
.412
.717
68.63
.280
1.04
.624
White
.556
.605
.384
.606
109.88
.500
.43
.575
Stewart
.555
.557
.549
.529
115.17
.25
.55
.486
Jackson
.546
.594
.499
.612
87.25
0
.71
.585
Clark
.534
.651
.332
.668
91.11
.500
.47
.562
McReynolds
.520
.550
.505
.463
101.00
2.55
Frankfurter
.512
.571
.453
.516
92.125
.335
.52
.465
Roberts, O.
.505
.546
.482
.535
112.13
1.55
Sutherland
.500
.429
.522
.500
30.00
1.96
Blackmun
.492
.504
.446
.503
102.40
.885
-.03
.470
Butler
.481
.531
.460
.429
134.00
1.90
Reed
.467
.617
.340
.631
92.65
.275
.35
.639
Stone
.384
.508
.316
.451
117.33
.700
-.07
Byrnes
.383
.523
.296
.577
115.00
.670
-.18
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TABLE 3 (CONTINUED)
FRACTION OF CONSERVATIVE VOTES IN NONUNANIMOUS CASES: 1937–2006 TERMS
FOR 43 SUPREME COURT JUSTICES RANKED FROM MORE TO LESS CONSERVATIVE
Fraction Conservative Votes1

Justice
All
Hughes
Souter
Brandeis
Breyer
Stevens
Fortas
Cardozo
Ginsburg
Warren
Black
Brennan
Goldberg
Rutledge
Murphy
Douglas
Marshall
1

.378
.374
.373
.372
.341
.336
.333
.312
.308
.283
.265
.248
.247
.241
.213
.211

Civ.
Lib
.510
.358
.492
.355
.325
.335
.800
.308
.334
.354
.249
.209
.270
.292
.187
.186

Econ
.322
.433
.323
.446
.399
.341
.211
.324
.257
.190
.312
.341
.227
.203
.253
.305

Adj.
Civ
Lib.
.395
.357
.412
.359
302
.195
.800
.302
.263
.300
.184
.110
.246
.195
.139
.133

Mean
Votes
Per
Term
120.50
54.59
110.00
50.31
79.47
107
24
51.36
103.63
105.09
113.41
100.67
93.29
96.40
98.08
109.50

Other Ideology Measures5
S/C
M/Q
Adj
3
Score Score
.Civ
2
Lib.4
.10
.675
-.82
.371
-.50
.525
-1.15
.387
.75
-1.56
.347
.155
-1.13
.179
-1.68
.320
-1.29
.337
.25
-1.12
.213
.125
-1.70
.259
0
-1.87
.203
.25
-.75
.112
0
-1.34
.237
0
-1.52
.209
.270
-4.07
.113
0
-2.72
.186

Fraction Conservative Votes are weighted by the number of cases the Justice voted on in each term in each
category. Civil Liberties includes criminal procedure, civil rights, first amendment, due process, attorney, federalism and judicial power. Economics includes economic, union and tax cases. Adjusted Civil Liberties category excludes federalism and judicial power from the broader Civil Liberties category.
2
S/C Perceived ideology of Justices prior to appointment is from Jeffrey Segal and Albert Cover, “Ideological
Values and the Votes of Supreme Court Justices,” Amer. Political Science Rev. 83: 557-565 (1989) and updated in Table 6-1 in Lee Epstein et. al. The Supreme Court Compendium: 4th Edition (2007).
3
M/Q Score is yearly average of posterior mean scores from Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn, “Dynamic
Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999,” 10 Political
Analysis 134 (2002). The data are available thru 2006 at mqscores.wustel.edu/index.
4
Votes in the adjusted civil liberties category for the 1946–2004 terms are from Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme
5 Court Compendium (2007) Table 6–4.
We converted the S/C and Epstein l estimates from liberal to conservative ideologies to facilitate comparison
with the estimates presented in the first four columns.
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TABLE 4
CORRELATION MATRIX OF IDEOLOGY MEASURES

All
Civ. Lib.
Econ.
Adj. Civ.
Lib.
Segal/
Cover
Martin/
Quinn

Civ.Lib.

Econ.

Adj. Civ.
Lib.

Segal/
Cover

Martin/
Quinn

Epstein
Adj. Civ.
Lib.

.90

.93

.91

.65

.88

.95

.73

.97

.62

.79

.96

.76

.63

.80

.84

.65

.76

.98

.59

.63
.91

Note: Correlations for All, Civ. Lib., Econ., Adj. Civ. Lib. and Martin/Quinn are for
average values from 1937–2006 for 43 judges; correlations for Segal/Cover are for 36
judges and Epstein Adj. Civil Liberties is for 32 judges.
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TABLE 5
FRACTION OF CONSERVATIVE VOTES IN NONUNANIMOUS CASES BY
SUBJECT MATTER AND BY POLITICAL PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT:
1937–2006 TERMS
Case
Category

Proportion of Conservative Votes
All
Judges
Judges
Appointed by
Appointed by
Republican
Democratic
President
President
.535
.603***
.436

1.38

12980

.466

.549***

.338

1.62

8678

First Amendment
Due Process

.454
.450

.507***
.531***

.387
.346

1.31
1.53

4522
2211

Privacy

.578

.589

.545

1.08

583

Attorneys

.469

.509*

.389

1.31

605

Unions

.423

.534***

.337

1.58

2382

Economic
Activity
Judicial
Power
Federalism

.405

.485***

.337

1.44

13217

.593

.625***

.558

1.12

7054

.445

.480**

.401

1.20

2595

Federal
Taxation

.344

.389*

.314

1.24

3337

All Categories

.473

.544***

.391

1.39

58165

Civil Liberties

.510

.570***

.428

1.33

39228

Economic
Regulation

.397

.475***

.333

1.43

18936

Criminal
Procedure
Civil Rights

Ratio

No.
Votes

Note: * significant at .05; **significant at the .01; and ***significant at the .001 level
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TABLE 6
DEFINITION AND MEANS OF VARIABLES
IN SUPREME COURT REGRESSIONS: 1937–2006
Variable
FrCon
ID
Pres
SenRep
Resid
Term
YrAppt
AppCt
SCRep

Definition

Mean

Fraction of conservative votes in all nonunanimous decisions
Segal-Cover perceived ideology from a content
analysis of newspaper editorials
1=Republican appointee; 0=Democratic appointee
Fraction of Republican senators at time of initial
appointment
Residual or unexplained ideology
Term of court or time trend variable
Term or year of Judge’s appointment to the Supreme Court
1=federal appellate judge prior to appointment; 0
otherwise
Fraction of other judges appointed by Republican
presidents

.472
.467
.535
.430
0
1971.5
1956
.349
.549

Note: The mean for FrCon is weighted by the number of votes per judge per term
in that category and the mean for SCRep is weighted by the number of terms of
each judge. The means for the remaining variables (except for the term variable
which is the midpoint between 1937 and 2006) are the averages for the 43 judges
in our sample.
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TABLE 7
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT VOTES IN
NONUNANIMOUS CASES: 1937–2006 TERMS
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Independent
Variables

Pres
SenRep

Segal-Cover
Score
(1)

.247*
(2.15)
.071
(0.13)

Residual
Term
YrAppt
AppCt

.006*
(2.38)
-.040
(0.43)

SCRep
Constant

-10.85
(2.37)

Dependent Variable
Fraction of Conservative Votes in NonUnanimous Cases
(2)
(3)
(4)
All judges
Rep. apDem.pointed
appointed
.076***
(4.04)
.431***
1.273***
.668***
(4.09)
(5.80)
(4.12)
.348***
.314***
.323***
(13.39)
(9.56)
(4.51)
–.002*
–.007***
.001
(2.60)
(5.48)
(0.95)
.007***
.012***
.001
(6.50)
(9.26)
(0.90)
–.068***
–.040
–.084*
(4.12).
(1.90)
(2.43)
–.166***
.015
–.194***
(3.68)
(0.14)
(3.52)
–8.115***
–8.959***
–4.900*
(4.59)
(3.57)
(2.19)

R2

.43

.46

.45

.39

N

36

614

332

282

Notes: (a) Regressions (2)–(4) are weighted regressions where each observation (a
judge-term) is weighted by the number of votes the judge casts per term. (b) Since Segal-Cover scores are only available for 36 judges appointed on or after 1937 (except for
Stone appointed in 1925), we excluded votes for 7 judges appointed before 1937 who
cast votes in the 1937–2000 period. The excluded judges only account for 22 observations because most were no longer on the court after 1940. (c) *significant at .05;
**significant at .01; and ***significant at .001 level.
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TABLE 8
DEFINITION AND MEANS OF VARIABLES FOR
SUPREME COURT REGRESSIONS; 1937–2004
(All Variables Are Per Court Term)
Variable

Definition

Mean

Dissent
Concur
OneVote

Fraction of Cases with Dissenting Opinion
Fraction of Cases with Concurring Opinion
Fraction of Cases Decided by a One-Vote
Margin
Fraction of Cases in which Appellant Prevailed
Fraction of Conservative Votes of Median
Justice
Difference between Justice with Maximum
and Minimum Fraction of Conservative
Votes
Number of New Justices

.584
.348
.152

Average years of Service of Justices on the
Court
Term or Time Trend Variable (1937–2004)
Number of Cases Decided by the Court

12.04

Reverse
Med_Judge
Range
New
Service
Term
Cases

.619
.528
.560
.5

1972.5
119.5
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TABLE 9
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT CASES
1937–2004 TERMS
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent Variables
Independent
Variables

Dissent
(1)

Concur
(2)

One-Vote
(3)

Reverse
(4)

Med_Judge

.243
(2.11)*
.308
(2.84)**
–.018
(0.89)
–.005
(3.83)***
_.006
(0.21)
–.001
(2.90)**
.707
(4.79)***

–.013
(1.60)
–.024
(0.37)
–.003
(0.18)
.005
(6.28)***
.001
(0.17)
.001
(2.98)**
–

.166**
(2.88)
.235
(5.10)***
–.005
(0.52)
.000
(0.08)
–.0005
(0.19)
–.000
(0.33)
_

–.468
(6.45)***
.116
(1.37)
–.003 (0.22)

–

9.998***
(4.02)

.445
(6.18)***
–9.916***
(6.44)

–.168
(0.15)

–1.783
(0.98)

R2

.57

.73

.59

.44

N

68

68

68

59

Range
New
Term
Service
Cases
Concur
Dissent
Constant

–

.001
(1.30)
.006
(1.27)
.001
(1.22)

Notes: *significant at .05; **significant at .01; and ***significant at .001 level
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TABLE 10
COURT OF APPEALS VOTES BY SUBJECT MATTER AND IDEOLOGY FOR 537
JUDGES: 1925–2002
Crim

Civ
Rts

First

DueProcess

Priv

Econ

Labor

Misc

Total

Conservative

7840

3106

604

493

135

10906

1608

585

25277

Liberal

2188

2039

519

226

68

11489

2273

606

19408

Mixed

693

487

101

57

14

1628

471

25

3476

Other

6024

294

115

90

3

7368

193

1058

15145

Total

16745

5926

1339

866

220

31391

4545

2274

63306

Note: We have excluded 482 votes the subject matter of which could not be determined.
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TABLE 11
FRACTION OF MIXED (M), CONSERVATIVE (C) AND LIBERAL (L) VOTES FOR 537 U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS JUDGES BY PRESIDENT AT TIME OF APPOINTMENT: 1925–2002
Harrison,
McKinley,
T. Roosevelt
& Taft
M
C
L

Category

Wilson

M

C

Harding,
Coolidge &
Hoover
L

M

C

Roosevelt &
Truman
L

M

C

Eisenhower

L

M

C

L

All

.028 .496 .476

Civil

.019 .462 .519 .032 .478 .490

.054 .462 .484 .044 .431 .526 .064 .472 .465

Criminal

.091 .742 .167 .041 .732 .228

.064 .747 .188 .043 .638 .218 .046 .766 .188

Constitutional

0

.806 .194

.018 .635 .347 .007 .649 .344 .048 .604 .347

Econ. & Labor

.021 .439 .540 .033 .458 .509

.058 .447 .495 .047 .415 .538 .069 .448 .484

Number
Tenure

11
26.5

17
17.1

38
15.3

76
14.1

45
12.3

Category

Kennedy/
Johnson

Nixon/Ford

Carter

Reagan

Bush

.684 .316 0

.033 .504 .463 .056 .492 .453 .044 .475 .482 .059 .541 .399

Clinton

All

M
C
L
M
C
L
.070 .494 .436 .085 .543 .372

M
C
L
M
C
L
M
C
L
M
C
L
.096 .507 .400 .098 .599 .303 .094 .627 .279 .084 .535 .381

Civil

.076 .422 .502 .091 .470 .439

.100 .452 .449 .105 .534 .361 .104 .566.329
.329 .094 .478 .428

Criminal

.055 .689 .255 .065 .760 .175

.091 .672 .237 .082 .767 .151 .068 .778 .154 .059 .684 .258

Constitutional

.080 .480 .440 .092 .551 .357

.099 .489 .413 .099 .601 .300 .09

Econ. & Labor

.078 .407 .515 .092 .439 .469 .103 .429 .467 .111 .499 .390 .112 .528 .360 .087 .460 .453

Number
Tenure

60
14.9

57
13.5

56
16.7

77
14.6

.624 .277 .107 .503 .391

37
12.2

59
8.3

Notes: (1) Republican presidents appointed all judges in our sample before Wilson except for one Cleveland appointee in 1892 that had no votes in our database; (2) Number denotes the number of judges appointed by the president whose votes are tabulated in sample; (3) Means (fractions) are weighted by the number
of judge votes; for example, in the All category, the fraction of each judge’s vote in the M, C and L classes is weighted by the judges total votes in the M, C and L
classes; (4) The constitutional category includes civil rights, first amendment due process and privacy cases; (5) Shaded areas are Republican and Unshaded are
Democratic Presidents
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TABLE 12
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COURT OF APPEALS VOTES:
1925–2002
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Independent
Variables

Pres
SenRep
YrAppt
Gender
Black
District Court
Fraction
Economic
Fraction
Miscellaneous
Circuit
Variables
Constant
R2

Dependent Variables
Civil Cases
Fraction
Liberal

Fraction
Mixed

***

(2)
–.028**
(2.97)
–.193***
(4.24)
–.001***
(3.74)
.004
(0.22)
.0.31
(1.22)
–.008
(1.14)
.114**
(2.70)
-.507*
(2.51)
***

(3)
.005
(1.15)
.000
(0.00)
.001***
(4.64)
–.010
(1.11)
–.005
(0.61)
.003
(0.82)
–.050**
(2.73)
.048
(0.49)
***

–.698
(0.96)

2.974***
(4.32)

–1.276***
(4.12)

Fraction
Conservative
(1)
.023*
(2.33)
.192***
(4.22)
.001
(1.54)
.006
(0.27)
–.025
(0.95)
.006
(0.73)
–.064*
(1.41)
.460
(2.19)

.21

.37

.35

Fraction
Conservative
(4)
.059***
(3.59)
.018
(0.20)
–.0003*
(2.47)
.013
(0.58)
–.068*
(2.47)
.009
(0.74)
-

Criminal Cases
Fraction
Fraction
Liberal
Mixed
(6)
(5)
–.051**
–.008
(3.31)
(1.16)
–.117
.100*
(1.40)
(2.47)
–.000
.0004**
(0.45)
(2.64)
–.019
.006
(0.81)
(0.38)
.048
.020
(1.50)
(1.24)
–.013
.006
(1.21)
(1.03)
-

-

-

-

***

***

***

1.250*
(1.96)

.553
(1.02)

–.803*
(2.59)

.22

.20

.11

No. Observa536
536
536
514
514
514
tions
Notes:
1) All regressions are weighted; the weights are equal either to the judge’s total votes in civil
cases (equations (1)-(3) or to his total votes in criminal cases (equations (4)-(6)).
(2) All regressions include 11 dummy circuit variables—circuits 1 to 11 with the D.C. circuit is
the left out circuit.
(3) *significant at .05; **significant at .01; and ***significant at .001 level.
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TABLE 13
CIRCUIT EFFECTS ON IDEOLOGY OF JUDGES’ VOTES
Civil Cases
Circuit
1st
2d
3d
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
D.C.

Conservative
+
+

Fraction
Liberal
–
–

–
–

+

+
+

–

–
–

+
+

+
+

–
–

–
–

Criminal Cases
Mixed
+

–

Conservative.
+

–

–

–
–
–

+
+

–
+
+
–

Fraction
Liberal

Mixed
+

+
+
+
–

–

–
–

+

–

Notes: (1) Shaded columns denote 1925–2002 regressions and unshaded columns denote 1925–2002 regressions.
(2) The D.C. circuit is the excluded variable.
(3) A positive (negative) sign denotes a significant positive (negative) effect
compared to the D.C. circuit.
(4) The absence of a sign for a circuit indicates that there is no significant difference between that circuit and the D.C. circuit.
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TABLE 14
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF APPELLATE COURT VOTES:
CURRENT JUDGES
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Independent
Variables

Pres
SenRep
YrAppt
Gender
Black
District Court
Fraction
Economic
Fraction
Miscellaneous
FrRep
FrRep_wtd
Constant
R2

Dependent Variables
Civil Cases
Criminal Cases
Fraction ConFraction ConFraction
Fraction
servative
servative
Conservative
Conservative
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
.092***
.092**
.092**
.092**
(3.47)
(3.38)
(3.23)
(2.97)
–,014
.021
.516*
.536*
(0.07)
(0.10)
(2.24)
(2.22)
.0004
.0004
–.0003
-.0002
(0.26)
(0.25)
(0.16)
(0.09)
.025
.030
.018
.027
(0.84)
(0.96)
(0.62)
(0.84)
.001
.015
.003
.009
(0.29)
(0.46)
(0.07)
(0.19)
–.016
–.015
.022
.024
(0.74)
(0.70)
(0.82)
(0.88)
–.266**
–.297**
(2.64)
(2.95)
–.378
–.464
(0.66)
(0.79)
.221**
.438***
(5.54)
(3.32)
–.458
(0.13)

.152*
(2.57)
–.427
(0.12)

.713
(0.21)

.332***
(4.90)
.492
(0.14)

.24

.21

.36

.31

No. Observa154
154
151
151
tions
Notes:
1) All regressions are weighted by the judge’s total votes in civil cases (equations (1)-(2) or
criminal cases (equations (3)-(4)).
2) *Significant at .05; **significant at .01: and ***significant at the .001 level.
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